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Dodd-Frank:  Toward First Principles? 
Reza Dibadj* 
INTRODUCTION 
When confronting a major crisis, tinkering at the margins of 
policy will likely do precious little either to ameliorate the system 
or avert the next catastrophe.  Rather, lawmakers need to return 
to first principles by examining the underlying causes of the 
crisis and stemming them.  Participating in a symposium over 
two years ago, well before the advent of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”),1 I 
argued that to mitigate, or perhaps even avoid, future disasters, 
policymakers should focus on remedying four pernicious 
facilitators to scandal: (1) the dissemination of information that 
is false or misleading; (2) the ability to abuse regulatory gaps; (3) 
the willingness to exploit credulous consumers; and (4) the use of 
corporate size to privatize profits and socialize losses.2  This 
Article, written a few months after the passage of Dodd-Frank, 
builds on this prior work to assess whether the statute effectively 
addresses these four root causes of our financial meltdown. 
Mapping the statute against these four facilitators, I argue 
that while a positive step forward in some respects, Dodd-Frank 
exhibits more of an intricate reaction to our last financial crisis 
than a concise attempt to address fundamental flaws in how Wall 
Street is regulated.  To some degree, this might be unsurprising, 
given that regulators were reacting ex post to a crisis rather than 
averting it ex ante.3  Yet Dodd-Frank makes surprisingly few 
important decisions.  Fascinatingly, along each of these four 
 
* Professor of Law, University of San Francisco.  I thank the editors of the 
Chapman Law Review for giving me the opportunity to present the ideas contained in this 
Article at the Journal’s Symposium, “From Wall Street to Main Street: The Future of 
Financial Regulation,” in Orange, California, on January 28, 2011. 
 1 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]. 
 2 See Reza Dibadj, Four Key Elements for Successful Financial Regulatory Reform, 6 
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 377, 377 (2010). 
 3 Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Bail-Ins Versus Bail-Outs: Using Contingent Capital to 
Mitigate Systemic Risk 2 (The Ctr. for Law and Econ. Studies, Columbia Univ. Sch. of 
Law, Working Paper No. 380, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1675015 
[hereinafter Coffee, Bail-Ins] (“Just as generals fight the next war in the terms of the 
mistakes made in the last war, so do financial regulators focus (possibly obsessively) on 
the immediate causes of the last financial contagion in planning for the future.”). 
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dimensions, the Act almost exclusively defers to agency 
rulemaking or the creation of a new organization.  Of perhaps 
even greater concern is the statute’s postponement of essential 
reforms to further study.4  Dodd-Frank’s ornate 848 pages are a 
far cry from Glass-Steagall’s 34 pages;5 ironically, the extra bulk 
diminishes rather than enhances the law’s effectiveness. 
This Article is structured into two principal sections.  In Part 
I, I outline each facilitator and examine what a first principles-
based response might encompass; then, I analyze what Dodd-
Frank did.  Each time, I find that while Dodd-Frank might 
contain some positive provisions, it ultimately fails to address the 
root causes of financial crisis.  To the extent there is a mismatch 
between first principles and the legislation, Part II asks why 
sophisticated lawmakers would choose largely to defer these 
issues rather than confront them more simply and directly.  
While there are benefits to statutory vagueness and delegation to 
agencies and courts, the main factor underlying voluminous 
legislation that ironically postpones the major questions lies in 
the political economy of twenty-first century Congressional action 
and the jostling among interest groups.  This Article concludes by 
suggesting that a path forward may lie in structural reforms 
pertaining to the legislative process. 
I.  FOUR FACILITATORS 
As I have argued in detail elsewhere, four phenomena have 
facilitated our current crisis: (1) the dissemination of information 
that is false or misleading; (2) the ability to abuse regulatory 
gaps; (3) the willingness to exploit credulous consumers; and (4) 
the use of corporate size to privatize profits and socialize losses.6  
Below, I argue that Dodd-Frank does not adequately address any 
of these facilitators. 
A. Dissemination of False or Misleading Information 
The first facilitator to crisis has been the dissemination of 
false or misleading information.  A very simple, though too often 
glossed-over, principle animating financial regulation is that 
markets must process information into prices for securities and 
 
 4 See Edward J. Kane, Missing Elements in US Financial Reform:  A Kübler-Ross 
Interpretation of the Inadequacy of the Dodd-Frank Act 27 (Aug. 24, 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1654051 (“In the end, many 
controversial issues were designated as subjects for further study.”). 
 5 See Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). 
 6 See Dibadj, supra note 2, at 377. 
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assets.  Inaccurate information leads the system to break down.7  
Two principal causes of inaccurate information have been the 
delegation of credit-rating functions to conflicted private actors 
unaccountable to the public, and a sharp curtailment of the 
ability to bring private antifraud lawsuits. 
Our current credit rating model, central to the economic 
collapse,8 suffers from two central infirmities.  First, given that 
issuers themselves pay for the securities to be rated, there is an 
inherent conflict of interest at the heart of the business model; 
after all, “banks and other issuers have paid rating agencies to 
appraise securities—a bit like a restaurant paying a critic to 
review its food, and only if the verdict is highly favorable.”9  
Second, “the credit rating system is one of capitalism’s strangest 
hybrids: profit-making companies that perform what is 
essentially a regulatory role.”10  In parallel, antifraud 
mechanisms have been watered down over the past several years 
as both federal statutes and federal common law have made it 
increasingly difficult to bring private securities antifraud 
lawsuits against disclosures that either finesse or obfuscate the 
truth.  While even a cursory glance at securities filings indicates 
that there is ample disclosure, such disclosures can be useless, 
perhaps even harmful, unless there is some mechanism to ensure 
their truthfulness.11 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, a triad of securities reform 
statutes began making it increasingly difficult to bring private 
 
 7 Id.  In the parlance of computer programmers, “garbage in, garbage out.” Id. at 
379. 
 8 See, e.g., William A. Birdthistle, Breaking Bucks in Money Market Funds, 2010 
WIS. L. REV. 1155, 1185 (“If there is widespread consensus on the profound failure of any 
single component of the U.S. financial system during the recent crisis, surely it is with 
these ratings agencies that continued to assign their highest ratings to securitized 
bundles of ultimately worthless subprime mortgages.”). 
 9 David Segal, Debt-Rating Agencies Avoid Broad Overhaul After Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 8, 2009, at A1.  See also Andrea J. Boyack, Lessons in Price Stability from the U.S. 
Real Estate Market Collapse, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 
27), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1665124 (“Today, the issuer of securities pays 
credit rating agencies to rate its product.  But this structure is fraught with conflict of 
interest and resulted in systematic over-rating of securities.”);; Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A 
Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008 at MM36 (noting that in structured finance deals, “the 
banks pay only if Moody’s delivers the desired rating . . . .  If Moody’s and a client bank 
don’t see eye to eye, the bank can either tweak the numbers or try its luck with a 
competitor like S.&P., a process known as ‘ratings shopping.’”). 
 10 Segal, supra note 9, at A22.  See also Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of 
Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2002) (“Rating 
agencies, however, are private companies.  They are not substantively regulated by the 
United States or any other major financial-center-nation.”). 
 11 As Adam Pritchard has observed, “Congress and the SEC focus almost exclusively 
on disclosure because it reinforces the myths of investor autonomy and sovereignty, a very 
lucrative myth as far as the financial services sector is concerned.” A.C. Pritchard, The 
SEC at 70: Time For Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1097–98 (2005). 
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antifraud claims.  First, in 1995 the Private Securities Reform 
Litigation Act (PSLRA) introduced, “inter alia, heightened 
pleading requirements for class actions alleging fraud in the sale 
of national securities.”12  One year later, in 1996, Congress 
passed the National Securities Market Improvements Acts 
(NSMIA) whose “primary purpose . . . was to preempt state ‘Blue 
Sky’ laws which required issuers to register many securities with 
state authorities prior to marketing in the state.”13  Third, the 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) in 1998 
made “federal court the exclusive venue for class actions alleging 
fraud in the sale of certain covered securities and by mandating 
that such class actions be governed exclusively by federal law.”14  
In sum, through heightened pleading standards and the 
preemption of more generous state securities laws, Congress has 
made it increasingly difficult for private plaintiffs to bring 
securities actions. 
Federal common law has evolved into a more defendant-
friendly posture as well.  Beginning with two landmark cases in 
1975—Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug15 and Cort v. Ash16—the 
United States Supreme Court has essentially cabined the federal 
common law of securities fraud.17  Over the past five years, and 
in rapid succession, the Court has placed restrictions on plaintiffs 
along two principal dimensions.  Decisions such as Dura,18 
Tellabs,19 and Stoneridge20 move in the direction of imposing 
heightened pleading requirements on plaintiffs.21  Moreover, 
opinions such as Merrill, Lynch,22 and Credit Suisse23 have 
 
 12 Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir. 2001).  See 
generally A.C. Pritchard, Constitutional Federalism, Individual Liberty, and the 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 435, 481–83 
(2000). 
 13 Lander, 251 F.3d 101, at 108.  The securities exempted, called “covered securities,” 
are those nationally listed on the New York or American Stock Exchanges, or on 
NASDAQ. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b).  Note, however, that the “NSMIA expressly preserved 
state authority to bring enforcement actions with respect to securities transactions.” 
Stefania A. Di Trolio, Public Choice Theory, Federalism, and the Sunny Side to Blue-Sky 
Laws, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1279, 1295 (2004). 
 14 Lander, 251 F.3d at 108. 
 15 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
 16 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
 17 See Reza Dibadj, An Uneasy Case for White-Collar “Martyrs,” 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 
505, 522 (2010). 
 18 Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
 19 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues and Rights, 551 U.S. 308 (2007). 
 20 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
 21 See generally Todd R. David, Jessica P. Corley & Ambreen A. Delawalla, 
Heightened Pleading Requirements, Due Diligence, Reliance, Loss Causation, and Truth-
On-The-Market—Available Defenses to Claims under Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities 
Act of 1933, 11 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 53 (2010). 
 22 Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006). 
 23 Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007). 
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effectively given broad preemptive effect to the federal securities 
regime, to the detriment of state securities and antitrust law, 
respectively.24 
A first principles-based approach would reform credit rating 
agencies and place greater emphasis on policing fraud.  First, 
government could provide public ratings or require investors, 
rather than issuers, to pay for ratings.25  At the very least, 
“upward adjustments and deviations from the CRA’s [credit 
rating agency’s] normal valuation model should be the regulatory 
focus.”26  Second, policymakers would need to reinvigorate 
private antifraud suits as a deterrent to the dissemination of 
misleading information—perhaps it is no coincidence that 
scandals have mushroomed in the post-1995 legal regime.  
Private enforcement might also be expanded beyond securities to 
financial regulation generally through mechanisms such as qui 
tam suits.27 
Sadly, Dodd-Frank achieves precious little on either front.  
To be sure, it increases internal controls, and provides for greater 
procedural transparency of credit rating agencies28—in a manner 
reminiscent of Sarbanes-Oxley.29  It also creates a new SEC 
“Office of Credit Ratings”30 while also confirming that there is a 
private right of action against rating agencies.31  All this may be 
fine as far as it goes,32 but the legislation does not alter the 
 
 24 See generally Melanie P. Goolsby, Note, Merrill Lynch v. Dabit: The Case of the 
Scorned Broker and the Death of the State Securities Fraud Class Action Suit, 67 LA. L. 
REV. 227 (2006); Stacey S. Chubbuck, Note, Securities Law and Antitrust Law: Two Legal 
Titans Clash Before the United States Supreme Court in Credit Suisse Securities v. 
Billing, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 145 (2009). 
 25 See, e.g., John C. Coffee Jr., Ratings Reform: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 5 
(Eur. Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 162, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1650802 [hereinafter Coffee, Ratings] (“Possible such responses 
include: (1) authorizing an independent body to select the rating agency; (2) mandating 
(and thereby effectively subsidizing) a ‘subscriber pays’ model for ratings;; and (3) creating 
a governmental rating agency to issue ratings . . . .”);; Schwarcz, supra note 10, at 16 (“In 
theory, a regulation could require investors to pay this fee, or could require an issuer to 
pay the fee irrespective of the rating ultimately assigned.”);; Michael Lewis & David 
Einhorn, How to Repair a Broken Financial World, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at WK10 
(“There should be a rule against issuers paying for ratings.  Either investors should pay 
for them privately or, if public ratings are deemed essential, they should be publicly 
provided.”). 
 26 Coffee, Ratings, supra note 25, at 56. 
 27 See, e.g., Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Private Enforcement of Systemic Risk 
Regulation, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 993, 1012 (2010) (“This Article suggests that reforms 
should include a private enforcement mechanism that directly addresses systemic risk.”). 
 28 See Dodd-Frank § 932. 
 29 See Stanley Keller, Corporate Governance, Disclosure & Capital Raising 
Provisions of the Dodd Frank Act, 14 WALL STREET LAWYER 1, 9 (2010). 
 30 See Dodd-Frank § 932(a) (modifying § 15E(p) of the Securities and Exchange Act 
of 1934). 
 31 See Dodd-Frank § 933. 
 32 Cf. Coffee, Ratings, supra note 25, at 50–51 (“An obvious (and politically 
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“issuer pays” business model of rating agencies.33  Nor does it 
contemplate making credit ratings a public good.  Instead, there 
will be studies on credit rating agency independence,34 
alternative credit agency business models,35 the creation of an 
independent professional rating analyst organization,36 and 
assigned credit ratings.37  Similarly, though the statute clarifies 
that “recklessness” is sufficient mens rea for SEC “aiding and 
abetting” actions38 and expands the SEC’s extraterritorial 
jurisdiction,39 it does not reinvigorate private antifraud suits.  All 
it does is commission studies on whether private rights of action 
should be extended extraterritorially40 or to secondary 
liability41—hardly a bold legislative move. 
B. Abuse of Regulatory Gaps  
A second facilitator that needs to be thwarted is the abuse of 
regulatory gaps.  There are regrettably too many examples of 
actors and products that have “fallen through the cracks” of 
regulatory oversight.42  Opportunists exploited the fact that 
banking, securities, commodities, and even insurance are each 
overseen by a different complex of regulators43—agencies that 
may not even share the same regulatory vision.44  Significantly 
 
irresistible) approach toward reform of the credit rating agencies is to regulate their 
internal corporate governance . . . .  From a policy perspective, it is difficult to place great 
hope on these reforms, but they are low cost reforms that may sometimes provide 
valuable information to experienced regulators.”). 
 33 See, e.g., DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE 
DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 7 (2011) (“[T]he legislation did 
not eliminate the ‘issuer pays’ feature of credit ratings . . . .”). 
 34 See Dodd-Frank § 939C. 
 35 See Dodd-Frank § 939D. 
 36 See Dodd-Frank § 939E. 
 37 See Dodd-Frank § 939F. 
 38 See Dodd-Frank §§ 929M(b), 929O. 
 39 See Dodd-Frank § 929P(b). 
 40 See Dodd-Frank § 929Y. 
 41 See Dodd-Frank § 929Z. 
 42 See, e.g., GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT 
J.P. MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE 
62 (2009). 
 43 See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Public Utility Holding Company Act a Model 
for Breaking Up the Banks that are Too-Big-to-Fail? 27 n.100 (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 202, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=16809887 (“Commercial banking activities are regulated by the 
bank regulators, securities activities are regulated by the SEC and state securities 
commissions.  Commodity futures and options activities are regulated by the CFTC, and 
insurance activities would be regulated by multiple state insurance regulators.”). 
 44 See, e.g., Kara Scannell, Exchanges Offer Varying Views as Regulators Discuss 
Turf, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2009, at A21 (“The two agencies [SEC and CFTC] have 
different philosophies in regulating markets.”);; Stephen Labaton & Edmund L. Andrews, 
As U.S. Overhauls Banking System, Two Top Regulators Feud, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 14, 2009, 
at A1 (“Two of the nation's most powerful bank regulators [Comptroller of the Currency 
and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation] were once again at each other's throats.”). 
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and in an era of financial conglomerates, “no agency had 
regulatory oversight and control of subsidiaries of holding 
companies that sheltered off-balance sheet liabilities and 
threatened the viability of its parent and regulated entities.”45  
Of particular salience in this regard is the so-called “shadow 
banking” system: as the Chairman of the FDIC observes, “[t]he 
principal enablers of our current difficulties were institutions 
that took on enormous risk by exploiting regulatory gaps between 
banks and the nonbank shadow financial system, and by using 
unregulated over-the-counter derivative contracts to develop 
volatile and potentially dangerous products.”46 
Given these fundamental problems, a first principles-based 
approach would strive for two basic goals: (1) simplifying and 
consolidating administrative agencies to resolve jurisdictional 
boundaries,47 and (2) regulating the “shadow” financial system.48 
Dodd-Frank actually achieves precious little toward 
achieving these goals.  To improve coordination, it creates the 
multi-agency Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)49 as 
well as the Office of Financial Research (OFR).50  While perhaps 
impressive at first glance, these actions are problematic.  Not 
only have multi-agency oversight bodies been difficult to 
implement,51 but the FSOC will be led by Treasury.  Similarly, 
the OFR will be housed within Treasury with no mandate to 
 
 45 Karmel, supra note 43, at 47. 
 46 Sheila C. Bair, The Case Against a Super-Regulator, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2009, at 
A29.  Sadly enough, “shadow” banking also contributed to prior scandals, notably Enron 
and Refco. See, e.g., Diana B. Henriques, Commodities: Latest Boom, Plentiful Risk, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 20, 2008, at A23; Deborah Solomon & Michael Schroeder, How Refco Fell 
Through Regulatory Cracks;; Scandal Highlights a System that Didn’t Require Much 
Oversight of the Firm’s Units, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2005, at A4. 
 47 See, e.g., Gary DeWaal, America Must Create a Single Financial Regulator, FIN. 
TIMES, May 19, 2005, at 13 (“[o]nly by amending its [financial] regulatory system and 
adopting unitary regulation of financial services can the US ensure it will maintain its 
supremacy as the home of global financial services participants.”). 
 48 See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, Both Sides of the Aisle See More Regulation, and Not Just 
of Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2008, at A15 (“Companies and instruments that currently 
are not regulated could be brought under the government's thumb; unregulated 
derivatives, hedge funds, mortgage brokers and credit-rating agencies all have been 
implicated in the current crisis.”). 
 49 See Dodd-Frank § 111.  Duties of the FSOC include to “identify gaps in regulation 
that could pose risks to the financial stability of the United States.” Dodd-Frank 
§ 112(a)(2)(G). 
 50 See Dodd-Frank § 152(a). 
 51 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response 
to the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 101), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1719126 (“Moreover, the 
future effectiveness of the FSOC is open to serious question in light of the agency turf 
battles and other bureaucratic failings that have plagued similar multi-agency oversight 
bodies in other fields of regulation . . . .”).  As just one example, consider that the FSOC’s 
recommendations when resolving disputes among agencies “shall not be binding on the 
Federal agencies that are parties to the dispute.” Dodd-Frank § 119(d). 
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report its findings to the public.52  The FSOC and OFR are thus 
likely to enhance Treasury’s power.53  While this may not be 
inherently bad, it does raise several questions: Treasury is 
neither an independent agency,54 nor does it face the legislative 
and judicial scrutiny that most other administrative agencies 
do.55  As such, delegation of power to Treasury raises serious 
issues in administrative law that Dodd-Frank elides.56 
In terms of agency consolidation, the legislation eliminates 
the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).57  But jurisdictional 
ambiguities—between the CFTC and the SEC and the FDIC and 
OCC, as just two examples—linger.  This is not even to mention 
the irony of Dodd-Frank creating more organizations in an 
environment where there are already too many regulatory gaps—
OFR, Federal Insurance Office (FIO),58 and Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection (BCFP),59 to name a few.60 
Dodd-Frank’s most significant attempt to close regulatory 
gaps is the requirement that some over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivative swaps61 be cleared and exchange traded.62  The 
 
 52 See, e.g., Kane, supra note 4, at 15 (“The OFR is authorized only to communicate 
its findings to FSOC and its member agencies and also to ‘support’ and ‘assist’ agencies in 
improving data collection.  But it is not specifically authorized or required also to report 
its findings or concerns to the public.”). 
 53 As David Skeel notes: “Yet the Treasury secretary is given leadership 
responsibility on the new Financial Stability Oversight Council and in other areas.  Dodd-
Frank also locates an enormous new research facility—the Office of Financial Research—
in the Treasury Department.  Control over knowledge is power, of course, which suggests 
that the ostensibly neutral research facility could become yet another channel of Treasury 
influence.” SKEEL, supra note 33, at 12; but see Priya Nandita Pooran, Legislative 
Advances in Financial Stability in the US—the Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act 2010, 83 AMICUS CURIAE 21, 24 (Autumn 2010) (noting “greater 
concentration of supervisory control in the Federal Reserve”). 
 54 See, e.g., SKEEL, supra note 33, at 12 (“Because the Treasury secretary is directly 
responsible to the President, he is the least independent, and the most political, of the 
financial regulators.”). 
 55 See David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 MINN. L. REV. 187, 190 (2010) 
(“Treasury has created for itself an ambit of discretion beyond the reach of the judiciary, 
and only somewhat within the bounds of congressional oversight.  The financial crisis 
illustrated just how independent Treasury has become.”). 
 56 This is perhaps unsurprising given that the initial blueprint for Dodd-Frank 
emerged from Treasury. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Financial Regulatory 
Reform: A New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation (2009), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf.  See 
also SKEEL, supra note 33, at 3 (“The Dodd-Frank Act got its start in March 2009, when 
the Department of the Treasury released a framework it called ‘Rules for the Regulatory 
Road’ shortly before a major meeting of the G-20 nations.”). 
 57 See Dodd-Frank § 313. 
 58 See Dodd-Frank § 502(a). 
 59 For a discussion of the BCFP see infra notes 113–122 and accompanying text. 
 60 Consider, for instance, the ambiguities in regulatory authority between the newly-
created BCFP and the Federal Trade Commission. See Dodd-Frank § 1031. 
 61 Derivative swaps “trade financial outcomes such as those of changing currency 
rates or of long-term for short-term interest rates.  Some derivatives are effectively 
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animating principle, of course, is that greater transparency will 
minimize risk.63  Even here, though, there are several concerns.  
First, close reading of the statutory language likely suggests that 
only standardized swaps will need to be cleared; customized ones 
would not and would only be subject to capital and margin 
requirements.64  As such, one can imagine the temptation to 
make contracts appear customized.65  Similarly, trades by non-
financial entities that are using swaps to “hedge or mitigate 
commercial risk” are excluded from the rule provided the CFTC 
is notified of how the counterparty intends to meet its financial 
obligations.66  For its part, the clearinghouse idea itself might be 
fraught with peril, as Mark Roe summarizes: 
Deep weaknesses afflict the clearinghouse, making it unwise to rely 
on it primarily, as Dodd-Frank has.  First, it’s unclear whether the 
exchange would itself be properly incentivized to handle counterparty 
risk, particularly if the major derivatives dealers themselves control 
the clearinghouse. 
Second, many types of derivatives just cannot be handled by a 
clearinghouse, because there’s no market price against which the 
 
guarantees of financial performance of a third party.  One party . . . promises to pay a 
risk-avoiding party if a third party defaults on its financial obligations.” Mark J. Roe, The 
Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 
539, 546–47 (2011). 
 62 See Dodd-Frank § 763.  See also Michael Greenberger, Is Our Economy Safe? A 
Proposal for Assessing the Success of Swaps Regulation under the Dodd-Frank Act 3 
(Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 2010-50, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1689174 (“The Dodd-Frank Act transforms the regulation of OTC 
derivatives by requiring that swaps be subject to clearing and exchange trading as well as 
capital and margin requirements.”). 
 63 See SKEEL, supra note 33, at 5 (“Clearing reduces the risk to each of the parties 
directly, while exchange trading reduces risk to them and to the financial system 
indirectly by making the derivatives market more transparent.”). 
 64 See Willa E. Gibson, Clearing and Trade Execution Requirements for OTC 
Derivatives Swaps Under the Frank-Dodd Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act 8 (Univ. of Akron Sch. Of Law, Research Paper No. 10-12, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1710822 (“[T]he Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act creates a 
bifurcated regulatory system that effectively subjects counterparties with standardized 
contracts for which a liquid market exists to clearing requirements, while subjecting 
counterparties that trade customized OTC derivatives swap contracts to certain capital 
and margin requirements and reporting requirements.”). This conclusion likely emerges 
from a detailed reading of provisions such as section 723 (adding § 2(h)(4)(B) to the 
Commodity Exchange Act) which discusses swaps that “no derivative clearing 
organization has listed” and section 731 (adding § 4s(e)(2) to the Commodity Exchange 
Act) which imposes capital and margin requirements “on all swaps that are not cleared by 
a registered derivatives clearing organization.” Dodd-Frank §§ 723, 731. 
 65 See Gibson, supra note 64, at 9 (“[W]ill the bifurcated regulatory system for OTC 
derivatives swap contracts incentivize market participants to customize their contracts to 
avoid the clearing requirements to which standardized trades are subject and to avoid the 
added transparency of exchange trading to which most cleared trades will be subject?”). 
 66 See Dodd-Frank § 723 (amending section 2(h)(7)(A) of the Commodity Exchange 
Act).  See also Greenberger, supra note 62, at 5 (“[R]egulators should carefully consider 
how they define hedging for commercial risk.”). 
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clearinghouse employees can mark the cleared but open transaction.  
Worse, one major class of derivatives—credit default swaps—face 
‘jump-to-default’ risk.  They look fine until the underlying security has 
a credit event and a huge payment is due.  Collateralizing these on an 
exchange or clearinghouse has proven to be difficult thus far and no 
easy solution is available. 67 
Third, and insidiously, a “clearinghouse ups the ante on ‘too-
big-to-fail,’ because the clearinghouse will itself be too big to 
fail.”68 
In addition, ambiguities in regulatory jurisdiction 
regrettably still remain,69 and there is nothing in the statute that 
requires disclosure of conflicts of interest when trading debt and 
its derivatives.70  An approach that is impressive at first glance 
thus largely dissolves upon closer inspection. 
One point that cannot be overemphasized is that the 
“shadow banking” system remains essentially unregulated.  As 
Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick point out, “[t]hree important 
gaps are in money-market mutual funds (MMMFs), 
securitization, and repurchase transactions (‘repo’).”71  
Securitization converts debt obligations such as mortgages into 
pools and allows them to be moved off-balance sheet, away from 
regulatory and investor scrutiny.72  Dodd-Frank tries to address 
this issue by asking a group of regulators to issue regulations on 
risk retention73 and disclosure.74  As expected, there are a variety 
of exemptions to the risk retention requirements, notably for 
 
 67 Roe, supra note 61, at 586–87. 
 68 Id. at 587.  Cf. Coffee, Bail-Ins, supra note 3, at 52 (noting how major stock and 
derivatives exchanges and the new clearinghouses “concentrate risk and so need to devise 
ways to avoid default.”). 
 69 See Dodd-Frank § 712 (asking the SEC and CFTC to “consult and coordinate to 
the extent possible”).  See also Gibson, supra note 64, at 11 (“[T]he Act allocates the 
jurisdiction of OTC derivatives swaps between the Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC) and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) . . . with the exception 
of identified banking products, which are within the regulatory jurisdiction of prudential 
banking regulators.”). 
 70 See, e.g., Jonathan C. Lipson, Controlling Creditor Opportunism 2–3, (Univ. of 
Wis. Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper Series Paper No. 1129, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1662127 (“The secondary debt market is essentially an 
unregulated securities market, which Dodd-Frank does not change.  Although Dodd-
Frank may put some derivatives on exchanges, nothing will force a distress investor to 
disclose to a troubled borrower—or its other stakeholders—that it simultaneously holds 
debt and a short, a combination that creates obviously perverse incentives.”). 
 71 Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System 1 (Oct. 
18, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1676947. 
 72 See Linda M. Beale, In the Wake of Financial Crisis, CURRENT DEV. MONETARY 
FIN. L. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 3), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1681577 (“[T]he off-balance sheet treatment of securitization vehicles was a genuine 
factor in the crisis, and should appropriately be addressed.”). 
 73 See Dodd-Frank § 941. 
 74 See Dodd-Frank § 942. 
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“qualified residential mortgages.”75  As such, the regulations are 
unlikely to reform the securitization market.  True to form, the 
statute commissions a study on the “macroeconomic effects of 
risk retention requirements.”76 
For their part, MMMFs appear similar to bank accounts, 
except for the inconvenient fact that after years of effective 
lobbying by the mutual fund industry, while MMMFs are allowed 
to maintain fixed net asset values (NAVs), they do not have to 
pay depositor insurance.77  The idea, of course, would be that in 
exchange for this additional risk, they offer higher returns to 
investors.  Yet, “[w]hen these funds needed insurance during the 
2008 debacle, the federal government provided it free of charge, 
thus rewarding the fund sponsors’ apathy.”78  Reform would be 
rather straightforward:  
[w]ere these [money market mutual] funds required to use the same 
pricing system [floating net asset values (NAVs)] as every other 
mutual fund or to contribute the same deposit insurance premia as 
bank accounts, they would either look a great deal less like those bank 
accounts or generate materially lower but more risk-appropriate 
yields.79 
Dodd-Frank, however, does not adopt either of these approaches. 
Finally, there are repurchase agreements, known as “repo” 
in the jargon.80  The repo problem is similar to that of MMMFs in 
 
 75 See Dodd-Frank § 941 (adding section 15G(e)(4)(B) to the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934). 
 76 Dodd-Frank § 946. 
 77 The history of how this came to be is not altogether inspiring: 
[T]hroughout the 1970s, sponsors of mutual funds petitioned the SEC for, and 
received, exemptions to use an alternative to the mark-to-market accounting 
technique.  By using a method known as amortized-cost accounting, money 
market funds could maintain a stable NAV [net asset value] that looks much 
more like the valuation of a bank deposit, thus dramatically closing the gap in 
appearances between the two instruments. 
Birdthistle, supra note 8, at 1174.  See also id. at 1170 (“And thus with a switch from 
floating to fixed pricing was laid the foundation of the massive run on money market 
funds that occurred during the 2008 financial crisis.”). 
 78 Id. at 1162–63. 
 79 Id. at 1161. 
 80 A repurchase agreement, 
is a sale of a financial instrument, such as a treasury bill, with the seller 
promising to buy that asset back, often the next day.  The agreed repurchase 
price is a little higher than the sale price, with the difference being the de facto 
interest.  The instrument sold is usually called the collateral, as the 
transaction is functionally a loan.  Repos are typically used to finance a firm, 
often a financial firm. 
Roe, supra note 61, at 546.  See also Beale, supra note 72, (manuscript at 4) (“For 
example, banks (and other firms) conducted ‘repo’ deals—purported sales transactions 
with repurchase arrangements that in reality functioned as financings—to make their 
balance sheets appear less leveraged.”). 
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that both “were initially perceived as safe and ‘money-like’, but 
later found to be imperfectly collateralized.”81  The mechanism 
behind overuse of repo, however, is different: “For large 
depositors, repo can act as a substitute for insured demand 
deposits because repo agreements are explicitly excluded under 
Chapter 11: that is they are not subject to the automatic stay 
[which protects debtors from creditor actions].”82  As such, “the 
bankruptcy ‘safe harbor’ for repo has been a crucial feature in the 
growth of shadow banking . . . .”83  This subsidy—garnered in 
part through effective lobbying,84 much like MMMFs’ fixed 
NAVs85—”encourages risky, knife’s-edge financing, which, when 
pursued in financially central firms, transfers risks to the United 
States as the ultimate guarantor of the key firms’ solvency.  We 
get more derivatives and repo activity than we would otherwise.  
Financial resiliency is drained; market discipline, weakened.”86  
A straightforward and effective approach would have been for 
Dodd-Frank to modify the priorities in bankruptcy.87 
In sum, Dodd-Frank’s willingness to close regulatory gaps 
appears limited: it “conspicuously avoids . . . regulatory 
consolidation among the nation’s illogical morass of financial 
regulators”88 while doing precious little to regulate the “shadow 
banking” system. 
 
 81 Gorton & Metrick, supra note 71, at 16. 
 82 Id. at 12.  As Mark Roe elaborates: 
Chapter 11 typically bars creditors from collecting on their loans from 
the bankrupt debtor, requires that creditors who preferentially seize 
security or get themselves repaid on the eve of bankruptcy return the 
assets seized or the repayment made, requires that fraudulent 
conveyances be recaptured by the debtor, and allows the debtor, but 
not the creditor, to affirm or reject outstanding contracts. 
None of these rules apply to a bankrupt’s derivatives and repo 
counterparties.  Instead, derivatives and repo players can seize 
collateral, more widely net out gains and losses on open contracts, 
terminate contracts, and keep eve-of-bankruptcy preference payments 
from the debtor that favor them over other creditors.  Their privileged 
capacity to jump the queue can induce a run on the failing financial 
institution, and such a run may have hit AIG, Bear Stearns, and 
Lehman, deepening and extending the recent financial crisis. 
Roe, supra note 61, at 588. 
 83 Gorton & Metrick, supra note 71, at 3. 
 84 See Roe, supra note 61, at 548 (“Regulators and lobbyists sought the exceptions 
when the derivatives market was young, partly to clarify some treatment issues, partly 
due to effective lobbying of the derivatives players, and partly due to a regulatory belief 
that such financial markets were sufficiently beneficial to warrant special treatment.”). 
 85 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 86 Roe, supra note 61, at 546. 
 87 See, e.g., id. at 549 (claiming it would have been better to have modified the 
derivatives and repo priorities in the Dodd-Frank financial package). 
 88 Lawrence G. Baxter, Did We Tame the Beast: Views on the US Financial Reform 
Bill, 2 J. REGULATION & RISK 209, 210 (2010). 
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C. Exploitation of Credulous Consumers 
A third facilitator has been the exploitation of credulous 
consumers and investors, upon whom an ever-increasing array of 
financial products and decisions has been foisted.  Regrettably, 
too many consumers are making risky life-changing decisions 
without having sufficient knowledge of financial basics such as 
the time value of money or the implications of credit.89  A first 
principles-based approach would pay particular attention to the 
regulation of advisers and funds who too often have not placed 
their clients’ interests ahead of their own, as well as to the self-
regulatory organizations (SROs)90 who, while imposing a 
significant compliance cost in regulating financial advisers and 
markets, have remained curiously ineffectual in recognizing and 
remedying major scandals and crises.91  It would also seek to 
improve the financial literacy of the population.  Unfortunately, 
though, while Dodd-Frank does introduce a few arguably positive 
developments, its provisions are unlikely to do much to stem this 
facilitator. 
When it comes to regulating advisers, the statute does create 
a category of private advisers who must register with the SEC.92  
Yet one should question the impact such registration will have.  
After all, registered broker-dealers and investment advisers have 
been involved in shocking fraud: recall, as just one particularly 
troubling example, that Bernard Madoff’s operations were 
registered as both a broker-dealer and as an investment 
adviser.93  To the extent one argues that such registration is even 
useful, the statute contains a significant loophole for so-called 
“foreign private advisers”—defined based on the number of U.S. 
 
 89 See, e.g., Thomas F. Cooley, America’s Financial Illiteracy, FORBES.COM (Jan. 1, 
2010, 12:01 AM EST), http://www.forbes.com/2010/01/12/cfpa-financial-illiteracy-credit-
cards-opinions-columnists-thomas-f-cooley.html. 
 90 Perhaps the most prominent contemporary SRO is the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (FINRA).  FINRA was “[c]reated in July 2007 through the 
consolidation of NASD [National Association of Securities Dealers] and the member 
regulation, enforcement and arbitration functions of the New York Stock Exchange.” 
Securities Regulation Resource Guide, CLEVELAND-MARSHALL COLLEGE OF LAW, 
http://devel-drupal.law.csuohio.edu/lawlibrary/resources/lawpubs/ 
SecuritiesRegulationResourceGuide.html. 
 91 As one article in the business press points out, “Wall Street’s self-regulators have 
missed virtually all of the major securities scandals of the past two decades—from 
troubles that brought down Kidder Peabody, to analysts’ conflicts, to favoritism in 
awarding initial-public-offering shares, to trading abuses at the Nasdaq Stock Market.” 
Laurie P. Cohen & Kate Kelly, NYSE Turmoil Poses Question: Can Wall Street Regulate 
Itself?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2003, at A1. 
 92 See Dodd-Frank §§ 402-403. 
 93 See, e.g., Liz Moyer, How Regulators Missed Madoff, FORBES.COM (Jan. 27, 2009, 
3:20 PM EST), http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/27/bernard-madoff-sec-business-wall-
street_0127_regulators.html. 
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investors and amounts of capital managed on behalf of U.S. 
investors,94 but not on U.S. securities holdings.95  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, major issues such as the obligations of broker-
dealers,96 the examination of investment advisers,97 and investor 
access to information on investment advisers and broker-
dealers98 are deferred to further study.  Similarly the regulation 
of SROs is essentially limited to giving the SEC authority to 
restrict pre-dispute arbitration,99 while calling for more study of 
whether it would be worthwhile to have SROs for investment 
advisers100 or private funds.101 
Even more troubling is the lack of attention to consumer 
education.  To be sure, the statute does make it more difficult to 
qualify as an “accredited investor” who has access to unregistered 
securities products,102 but to the extent income or net worth is 
even a proxy for financial sophistication, one could be forgiven for 
wondering whether tweaking the definition will make any 
difference.  As one might expect, we are treated to a cornucopia of 
future studies: issues as significant as financial literacy among 
investors,103 mutual fund advertising,104 financial planners and 
financial designations,105 the thresholds for accredited 
investors,106 credit scores,107 and person to person lending,108 are 
left for another day.  In the same vein, one might wonder what 
impact the new mortgage lending standards outlined in the 
 
 94 See Dodd-Frank § 402(a).  See also Michael I. Overmyer, Note, The “Foreign 
Private Adviser” Exemption: A Potential Gap in the New Systemic Risk Regulatory 
Architecture, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2185, 2186–87 (2010) (“The WSRCPA [Dodd-Frank] 
excludes from its registration requirement foreign hedge fund managers whose funds do 
not meet certain thresholds regarding numbers of U.S. investors or amounts of capital 
managed on behalf of U.S. investors.”). 
 95 As one observer summarizes it, “[m]anagers of hedge funds based in another 
country and that lack significant participation from American investors, but which 
nonetheless could contribute to systemic risk in the U.S. economy, do not need to 
register.” Id. at 2213.  The suggestion would be that “U.S. law should require managers of 
foreign hedge funds with a sufficiently large presence in U.S. markets to register with the 
SEC.” Id. at 2219. 
 96 See Dodd-Frank § 913.  See also Reza Dibadj, Brokers, Fiduciaries and a 
Beginning, 30 REV. OF BANKING AND FIN. L. 205 (2011) (discussing the possibility of 
fiduciary duties for brokers). 
 97 See Dodd-Frank § 914. 
 98 See Dodd-Frank § 919B. 
 99 See Dodd-Frank § 921. 
 100 See Dodd-Frank § 914(a)(2)(B). 
 101 See Dodd-Frank § 416. 
 102 The new standard excludes an investor’s primary residence in calculating the one 
million dollar net worth threshold. See Dodd-Frank § 413(a). 
 103 See Dodd-Frank § 917. 
 104 See Dodd-Frank § 918. 
 105 See Dodd-Frank § 919C. 
 106 See Dodd-Frank § 415. 
 107 See Dodd-Frank § 1078(a). 
 108 See Dodd-Frank § 989F(a)(1). 
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statute109 will have and simply note that important topics—
reverse mortgages,110 appraisal methods,111 mortgage foreclosure 
rescue scams and loan modification fraud112—are once again 
simply remitted to future study. 
Finally, arguably the best hope the statute provides in 
protecting consumers is the creation of the Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection (BCFP)113 “for the purpose of ensuring that 
all consumers have access to markets for consumer financial 
products and services and that markets for consumer financial 
products and services are fair, transparent, and competitive.”114  
Though it is too early to assess the BCFP’s performance, a 
careful reading of the statute raises some concerns.  For example, 
the BCFP will operate under the auspices of the Federal Reserve 
System (Federal Reserve),115 an entity whose primary focus is not 
consumer protection; its decisions can be set aside by the 
FSOC,116 and it is not authorized to impose a usury limit.117  
Furthermore, no private right of action is created to supplement 
the BCFP’s enforcement.118  Of perhaps greatest concern is that 
the statutory authority given to the BCFP to address “unfair” 
practices is actually not one predicated on consumer protection, 
but mandates a cost-benefit analysis focused on overall economic 
efficiency.119  While there might be some hope in the additional 
“abusive” standard Dodd-Frank articulates,120 one could be 
 
 109 See Dodd-Frank § 1411. 
 110 See Dodd-Frank § 1076. 
 111 See Dodd-Frank § 1476(a)(1)(A). 
 112 See Dodd-Frank § 1492. 
 113 See Dodd-Frank § 1011. 
 114 Dodd-Frank § 1021(a).  See also SKEEL, supra note 33 at 14 (noting that the BCFP 
was created “to serve as a consumer watchdog with respect to credit card and mortgage 
practices”). 
 115 See Dodd-Frank § 1011(a). 
 116 See Dodd-Frank § 1023. 
 117 See Dodd-Frank § 1027(o). 
 118 See, e.g., Carey Alexander, Abusive:  Dodd-Frank Section 1031 and the Continuing 
Struggle to Protect Consumers 17–18 (St. John’s Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series, Paper No. 10-193 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1719600 (“The 
CFPB [Consumer Financial Protection Bureau], by contrast, does not need to set the bar 
for abusive conduct nearly as high as the FDCPA [Fair Debt Collection Practice Act] 
because Dodd-Frank does not authorize a private right of action.”). 
 119 See Dodd-Frank § 1031(c)(1). 
 120 Section 1031(d) states that an “act or practice” cannot be deemed “abusive” unless 
it: 
(1) materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a term or 
condition of a consumer financial product or service; or 
(2) takes unreasonable advantage of— 
(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the material risks, 
costs, or conditions of the product or service; 
(B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the consumer in 
selecting or using a consumer financial product or service; or 
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forgiven for lamenting that “Congress has, for the first time in 
recent memory, subordinated the goal of fairness in consumer 
credit transactions to a new goal of economic efficiency.”121  To 
the extent the BCFP flexes its muscles, one can only imagine the 
spate of lawsuits alleging it exceeded its statutory authority.  In 
sum, “the future landscape for the field of consumer financial 
protection is filled with uncertainty.”122 
D. Use of Corporate Size to Privatize Profits and Socialize 
Losses 
In addition to the dissemination of misleading information, 
abuse of regulatory gaps, and exploitation of credulous 
consumers, there is one additional crucial facilitator: the ability 
to use corporate size to privatize profits and socialize costs.  With 
the creation of corporate behemoths via mergers and 
acquisitions, industries such as financial services have become 
increasingly concentrated and oligopolistic.123 
Large companies become so large and complex that they 
emerge as “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF)—a clever posture that 
internalizes profits when things go well and externalizes costs 
when they do not.  It is perhaps easy to forget that the financial 
actors at the center of the financial meltdown were chasing 
higher profits by extending subprime loans and trading esoteric 
financial products.  All this may be fine as far as it goes, of 
course, provided that these same actors suffer the financial 
repercussions of their risky behavior if things go wrong.  Instead, 
these apparently sophisticated actors turned to the federal 
 
(C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person to act in the 
interests of the consumer. 
Dodd-Frank § 1031(d).  See also Alexander, supra note 118, at 20 (“Congress’s enactment 
of a flexible definition of abusive, coupled with Congress’s clear dissatisfaction with the 
Fed’s narrow interpretation of its powers to reach abusive practices suggests that the 
CFPB should adopt a broad, expansive interpretation of its powers to address abusive 
practices.”);; Vincent di Lorenzo, The Federal Financial Consumer Protection Agency: A 
New Era of Protection or More of the Same? 89–90 (St. John’s Univ. Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series No. 10-0182, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1674016 (explaining that if the “abusive” standard were in 
practice from 2002–2008 it “would have allowed the Bureau to prohibit or regulate many 
loan products and practices”);; Boyack, supra note 9, at 60 (“The addition of the word 
‘abusive’ in the Dodd-Frank Act, however, suggests an expanded definition of liability.”). 
 121 Di Lorenzo, supra note 120, at 84.  See also id. (“Two consequences surface from 
the embrace by Congress of a net societal benefits standard for future regulatory 
intervention: (a) the adverse legislative signal created by Congress, and (b) the possibility 
of a less responsive Consumer Protection Bureau.”). 
 122 Id. at 85. 
 123 See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, Deregulation: A Tragedy in Three Acts, WASH. POST, Sept. 
13, 2003, at A21. 
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government for a bailout under the theory that they are simply 
TBTF.124 
The culminating affront here, of course, is that it is the 
individual—the ordinary taxpayer who has already suffered 
mightily as shareholder and consumer—who is asked to be the 
insurer of last resort and reallocate resources to financial actors 
who were imprudent in the first place.125  Above all, TBTF 
facilitates hypocrisy: it extols the virtues of free markets and 
private profits, then conveniently comes begging to Washington 
to socialize the losses.126 
At the root of TBTF is antitrust policy that over the past 
forty years has stood idly by and condoned the creation of large 
corporate behemoths in a variety of industries, including 
financial services.127  Consider that by 1999 advocates of 
deregulation obtained the formal repeal of the Glass-Steagall 
Act, which had separated commercial from investment banking—
successfully arguing that antitrust laws would forbid mergers 
unfriendly to consumers.128  The following decade witnessed an 
explosion of bank mergers and acquisitions,129 followed by our 
current bailout woes.130 
Simply put, a first principles-based approach would enforce 
the antitrust laws.131  Sadly enough, the current ethos has lost 
 
 124 Reza Dibadj, How Does the Government Interact with Business?: From History to 
Controversies, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 707, 722 (2010).  Cf. Baxter, supra note 88, 
at 212 (“Despite their assertions of efficiencies of scale, these financial conglomerates 
have long ceased to be as efficient as their smaller counterparts.  So their economic value 
is questionable.  What is worse is that the value of the de facto public subsidies they enjoy 
is substantial.”). 
 125 See e.g., Schooner, supra note 27, at 1011 (“Ultimately, much of the costs of 
systemic crisis are borne by the taxpayer.”). 
 126 Cf. Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch, The Public-Private Distinction in 
American Law and Life, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 237, 249 (1987) (“Private companies rarely turn 
down the opportunity to feed greedily at the public trough.”). 
 127 See, e.g., Gary Minda, Antitrust at Century’s End, 48 SMU L. REV. 1749, 1769 
(1995); Frederick M. Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The 
Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511, 1527–28 (1984).  A leading 
antitrust monograph even declares that the “very ubiquity of merger-created efficiencies 
is why we evaluate mergers under a fairly benign set of rules.” HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 219 (2005). 
 128 See Aigbe Akhigbe & Ann Marie Whyte, 36 FIN. REV. 119, 120 (2001). 
 129 See, e.g., Wilmarth, supra note 51, (manuscript at 33) (“All of today’s four largest 
U.S. banks (BofA, Chase, Citigroup and Wells Fargo) are the products of serial 
acquisitions and explosive growth since 1990.”). 
 130 It is fascinating to observe how policymakers enamored of simplistic deregulation 
were able to assuage critics by casting off responsibility to antitrust.  Later, when faced 
with deregulation’s shortcomings, the deregulators could conveniently shift the blame to 
lax antitrust enforcement like the child’s game of “hot potato.” See Reza Dibadj, Saving 
Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 745, 747 (2004). 
 131 See, e.g., Beale, supra note 72, (manuscript at 23) (“Rather than continue to 
encourage consolidation of financial institutions, we likely need to revamp our antitrust 
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sight of the fact that antitrust “was premised upon a political 
judgment that decentralized market power was essential to a free 
society.”132  It is time to reconsider whether contemporary 
antitrust policy should be so demure.  To the extent financial 
conglomerates are already too big, they would be 
disaggregated.133  Note, by contrast, that “the emergency 
acquisitions of LCFIs [large, complex financial institutions] 
arranged by U.S. regulators have produced domestic financial 
markets in which the largest institutions hold even greater 
dominance.”134  The supervening irony, of course, is that 
taxpayers have unwittingly funded the next round of 
consolidation. 
Perhaps it is unsurprising by now to observe that Dodd-
Frank does not take this straightforward structural approach;135 
rather, it is peppered with provisions that seem impressive at 
first glance but run the risk of being largely ineffectual.  Overall, 
“Dodd-Frank sets forth no comprehensive plan for controlling the 
size or complexity of the mega-banks.”136  Predictably, issues 
such as concentration limits137 and the effect of size and 
complexity of financial institutions138 are left to further study. 
Reaching this pessimistic conclusion, however, requires a 
careful reading of Dodd-Frank’s multiple provisions that 
ostensibly seek to stop TBTF.  To begin with, there are several 
measures that would appear to prevent another systemic 
meltdown by limiting size and enhancing capital requirements.  
 
policies to recognize that concentrated power in an industry that arises from sheer size, 
leverage, and interconnectedness may merit the trust-busting power of the anti-trust 
rules.”). 
 132 Minda, supra note 127, at 1755. 
 133 As two commentators suggest: 
If a failing firm is deemed “too big” for that honor, then it should be explicitly 
nationalized, both to limit its effect on other firms and to protect the guts of the 
system.  Its shareholders should be wiped out, and its management replaced.  
Its valuable parts should be sold off as functioning businesses to the highest 
bidders—perhaps to some bank that was not swept up in the credit bubble.  The 
rest should be liquidated, in calm markets.  Do this and, for everyone except the 
firms that invented the mess, the pain will likely subside. 
Lewis & Einhorn, supra note 25, at WK10. 
 134 Wilmarth, supra note 51, (manuscript at 34). 
 135 See id. at 2 (“Dodd-Frank fails to make fundamental structural reforms that could 
largely eliminate the subsidies currently exploited by LCFIs [large, complex financial 
institutions].”). 
 136 Karmel, supra note 43, at 48.  See also id. at 7 (“[U]nder Dodd-Frank, functional 
regulation remains in place so that different agencies with different approaches continue 
to regulate financial institutions and markets, and the largest financial institutions have 
grown even large than they were before, thus increasing the risks and costs of their 
failure.”). 
 137 See Dodd-Frank § 123. 
 138 See Dodd-Frank § 622 (modifying § 14(e) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 
1956). 
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First, the statute imposes a ten percent nationwide deposit 
cap.139  However, a similar cap has been in existence since the 
1994 Riegle-Neal Act140—Dodd-Frank merely extends the Riegle-
Neal limits to mergers involving thrifts and industrial banks.141  
Crucially, as one scholar observes:  
[Section] 623 leaves open the other Riegle-Neal loopholes because (1) 
it does not apply the nationwide deposit cap to intrastate acquisitions 
or mergers, (2) it does not apply the statewide deposit cap to interstate 
transactions involving thrifts or industrial banks or to any type of 
intrastate transaction, and (3) it does not impose any enhanced 
substantive or procedural requirements for invoking the failing bank 
exception.142 
These loopholes, notably the “failing bank exception,” render 
the benefit of the ten percent cap largely illusory.143 
Second, the so-called Kanjorski Amendment144 “provides the 
FRB [Federal Reserve Board] with potential authority to require 
large BHCs [bank holding companies] or nonbank SIFIs 
[systemically important financial institutions] to divest high-risk 
operations.”145  Unfortunately, however, this power is subject to 
strict procedural requirements146 making it very unlikely to ever 
apply.147 
 
 139 See Dodd-Frank § 623. 
 140 See Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. 
No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (Sept. 29, 1994). 
 141 See, e.g., Wilmarth, supra note 51, (manuscript at 40) (“Section 623 of Dodd-Frank 
does extend Riegle-Neal’s ten percent nationwide deposit cap to reach all interstate 
acquisitions and mergers involving any type of FDIC-insured depository institution.  
Thus, interstate acquisitions and mergers involving thrift institutions and industrial 
banks are now subject to the nationwide deposit cap to the same extent as interstate 
acquisitions and mergers involving commercial banks.”). 
 142 Id. 
 143 See id. (manuscript at 4) (“Congress did not adequately strengthen statutory 
limits on the ability of LCFIs to grow through mergers and acquisitions.”).  Section 622 
does impose a ten percent liability cap on mergers and acquisitions of financial companies 
“[s]ubject to the recommendations” of the FSOC. See Dodd-Frank § 622 (modifying § 14(c) 
of the Bank Holding Act of 1956).  This concentration limit, however, maintains the 
failing bank exception. See Dodd-Frank § 622 (modifying § 14(c) of the Bank Holding Act 
of 1956).  In addition, as one author suggests, “LCFIs [large, complex financial 
institutions] will almost certainly urge the FSOC to weaken or remove the liabilities cap 
under § 622.” Wilmarth, supra note 51, (manuscript at 42). 
 144 See Wilmarth, supra note 51, (manuscript at 71).  See also Dodd-Frank § 121(a) 
(codifying the “Kanjorski Amendment”). 
 145 Wilmarth, supra note 51, (manuscript at 71). 
 146 See Dodd-Frank § 121(b) (discussing various notice and hearing requirements). 
 147 See, e.g., Wilmarth, supra note 51, (manuscript at 72) (“The FRB’s divestiture 
authority under § 121 is thus a last resort, and it is restricted by numerous procedural 
requirements (including, most notably, a two-thirds vote by the FSOC). . . .  [Thus,] the 
prospects for an FRB-ordered breakup of a SIFI seem remote at best.”). 
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Third, the Collins Amendment outlines risk-based and 
leverage capital standards.148  Even here, however, there are at 
least two problems.  First, the amendment defers to agencies to 
establish parameters for both minimum leverage capital149 and 
minimum risk-based capital.150  Second, and more importantly, 
capital-based regulation has repeatedly been unsuccessful in 
preventing financial crises.151  As one might expect, the statute 
even commissions a study on holding company capital 
requirements.152 
Two other provisions, arguably more complex in scope, seek 
to limit interconnectedness rather than simply size or risky 
capital.  At first glance, “the Volcker Rule generally prohibits 
banks from engaging in proprietary trading (that is, trading that 
is on its own behalf and not a customer’s) or acquiring or 
retaining an interest in a hedge fund or private equity fund.”153  
Closer reading, however, reveals a number of exceptions: non-
bank financial companies,154 certain financial instruments,155 and 
“[r]isk-mitigating hedging activities”156 are excluded; 
“proprietary” is a rather loose term of art;157 and banks are 
 
 148 See Dodd-Frank § 171. 
 149 See Dodd-Frank § 171(b)(1). 
 150 See Dodd-Frank § 171(b)(2). 
 151 See, e.g., Wilmarth, supra note 51, (manuscript at 100) (“Dodd-Frank (like Basel 
III) relies primarily on the same supervisory tool—capital-based regulation—that failed to 
prevent the banking and thrift crises of the 1980s as well as the current financial crisis.”). 
 152 See Dodd-Frank § 174.  Perhaps the one bright spot is the power given to the 
Federal Reserve to require financial entities “to maintain a minimum amount of 
contingent capital that is convertible to equity in times of financial stress.” Dodd-Frank 
§ 165(c)(1).  See also Coffee, Bail-Ins, supra note 3, at 43 (“Contingent capital achieves two 
objectives at once: (1) avoidance of default, and (2) alteration of voting power.”). 
 153 Greenberger, supra note 62, at 4.  See also Dodd-Frank § 619 (prohibiting banks 
from engaging in proprietary trading). 
 154 See Dodd-Frank § 619(a)(2) (amending § 13(a)(2) of the Bank Holding Company 
Act of 1956). 
 155 See Dodd-Frank § 619 (amending § 13(d)(1)(A) of the Bank Holding Company Act 
of 1956).  See also Malcolm S. Salter, Lawful but Corrupt: Gaming and the Problem of 
Institutional Corruption in the Private Sector 23 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 
11-060, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1726004 (“The act’s ban on 
proprietary trading also allows banks to engage in trade in several other types of 
instruments, such as those issued by Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mac, the Federal Home Loan 
Bank, two federal agricultural banking institutions, and states and municipalities.”). 
 156 Dodd-Frank § 619(d)(1)(C) (amending § 13(d)(1)(A) of the Bank Holding Company 
Act of 1956). 
 157 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank § 619(d)(1)(B) (revising § 13(d)(1)(B) of the Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956) (permitting “[t]he purchase, sale, acquisition, or disposition of 
securities and other instruments . . . in connection with underwriting or market-making-
related activities, to the extent that any such activities . . . are designed not to exceed the 
reasonably expected near term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties”);; Dodd-
Frank § 619(d)(1)(D) (revising § 13(d)(1)(D) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956) 
(permitting “[t]he purchase, sale, acquisition, or disposition of securities and other 
instruments . . . on behalf of customers.”).  See also SKEEL, supra note 33, at 10 
(“Although the Volcker Rule is forcing banks to adjust their operations, the concept of 
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allowed to invest up to three percent of their capital in activities 
prohibited by the Volcker Rule158—a significant amount when it 
comes to a bank trading on its own behalf.159  Par for the course, 
the statute defers to further study the real issues behind bank 
investment activities160 and proprietary trading.161 
The second provision seeking to limit interconnectedness is 
the Lincoln Amendment or “Push-Out” rule “which prohibits 
federal assistance to any bank operating as a swap dealer.”162  
Yet, once again, the rule contains numerous loopholes.163 
Beyond these purported attempts to manage TBTF, and 
presumably as a last resort, Dodd-Frank establishes an orderly 
liquidation authority (OLA) to mitigate economic fallout if a 
systemically important financial institution fails.164  OLA, 
however, is fraught with both obvious and subtle problems.  It 
“does not require SIFIs [systemically important financial 
institutions] to pay risk-based assessments to pre-fund the 
Orderly Liquidation Fund (“OLF”), which will cover the costs of 
resolving failed SIFIs.  Instead, the OLF will have to borrow the 
necessary funds in the first instance from the Treasury (i.e., the 
taxpayers).”165  Like much of Dodd-Frank, OLA operates at the 
 
proprietary trading is so slippery that its application will depend on how, and how 
strictly, regulators interpret it.”).  As one example of gamesmanship, consider the “view 
that the [Volcker Rule] could be gamed by having traders trade in contemplation of 
potential trades a client may want to do in order to have an inventory of financial assets 
readily available.” Beale, supra note 72, (manuscript at 24). 
 158 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank § 619(d)(4)(B)(ii)(II) (“[I]n no case may the aggregate of all of 
the interests of the banking entity in all such funds exceed 3 percent of the Tier 1 capital 
of the banking entity.”). 
 159 See, e.g., Salter, supra note 155, at 23 (“The best way to understand the connection 
is to consider the 3 percent rule as a massive loophole that allows every banking entity in 
America to skirt the ban on risky proprietary trading by investing as much as 3 percent of 
their capital in such funds.”). 
 160 See Dodd-Frank § 620. 
 161 See Dodd-Frank § 989(b)(1). 
 162 Greenberger, supra note 62, at 4.  “Federal assistance is defined broadly to 
include, inter alia, federal deposit insurance or access to the Federal Reserve’s discount 
window.” Id.  See also Dodd-Frank § 716(b)(1). 
 163 As one scholar outlines:  
As enacted, the Lincoln Amendment allows an FDIC-insured bank to act as a 
swaps dealer with regard to (i) “[h]edging and other similar risk mitigating 
activities directly related to the [bank’s] activities,” (ii) swaps involving interest 
rates, currency rates and other “reference assets that are permissible for 
investment by a national bank,” including gold and silver but not other types of 
metals, energy, or agricultural commodities, and (iii) credit default swaps that 
are cleared pursuant to Dodd-Frank and carry investment-grade ratings.  
Wilmarth, supra note 51, (manuscript at 79–80) (quoting Dodd-Frank § 716(d)). 
 164 See Dodd-Frank § 204(a) (“It is the purpose of this title to provide the necessary 
authority to liquidate failing financial companies that pose a significant risk to the 
financial stability of the United States in a manner that mitigates such risk and 
minimizes moral hazard.”). 
 165 Wilmarth, supra note 51, (manuscript at 4–5).  See also id. (manuscript at 64) (“It 
is contrary to customary insurance principles to establish an OLF that is funded only 
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discretion of regulators166—notably, the Treasury.167  More 
subtly, OLA may end up acting at a point when it is already too 
late to salvage a firm.  John Coffee points out the irony: 
Essentially, it [Dodd-Frank] denies bank regulators the ability to 
target funds to threatened financial institutions, except in cases 
where the financial institution is to be liquidated pursuant to the 
FDIC’s resolution authority.  Thus, the FDIC can advance funds, or 
guarantee debts, to those firms under the death sentence of 
liquidation, but neither it nor the Federal Reserve can do much to 
help the potentially solvent firm that is teetering on the brink.  
Because most financial firms are unlikely to concede that they are 
insolvent (but may readily acknowledge that they need liquidity), the 
central banker after Dodd-Frank is unlikely to perform its traditional 
“lender of last resort” function and must act more as a financial 
undertaker.168 
In addition, OLA simply creates a parallel bankruptcy 
regime to Chapter 11.  Not only is it unclear exactly to which 
financial entities OLA will apply,169 “[b]ut by developing a new 
system for addressing financial distress, instead of integrating 
the new system into the existing structure of the Bankruptcy 
Code, the financial reform act simply recreates the prior problem 
in a new place.”170  In sum, “contrary to the statute’s stated 
purpose, Dodd-Frank’s OLA does not preclude future bailouts for 
creditors of TBTF institutions.”171  As is typical throughout Dodd-
Frank, the issue of a bankruptcy process for financial institutions 
remains a subject for further study.172 
 
after a SIFI fails and must be liquidated.”).  The assessments the OLA contemplates are 
imposed ex post. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank § 210(o)(1)(D). 
 166 See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, The Risks of Fractured Resolution—Financial 
Institutions and Bankruptcy 13 (Seton Hall Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law Research Paper 
No. 1726944, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1726944 (“[T]he new resolution 
authority is a process that must be invoked by regulators, and thus might be subject to 
delay or even neglect if the regulators disdain the new procedures.”). 
 167 See, e.g., id. at 17 (“The key player in initiation is the Treasury Secretary, an 
inherently political actor who is unlikely to be able to make commitments that will last 
beyond any particular Secretary’s term in office.”).  For a discussion of Treasury as 
regulator, see supra notes 51–56, and accompanying text. 
 168 Coffee, Bail-Ins, supra note 3, at 30. 
 169 In the words of one bankruptcy scholar:  
Save for when the Dodd-Frank Act’s new resolution authority applies, chapter 
11 remains the primary instrument for resolving financial institutions.  Unless 
a specialized regime is in place, such as those for banks or insurance companies, 
chapter 11 will apply.  Thus, hedge funds, private equity funds, investment 
banks, and the parent companies of banks and insurance companies will all face 
resolution under chapter 11 unless the entity in question can be resolved under 
the new resolution authority and the Secretary of the Treasury decides to 
invoke the authority . . . .  
Lubben, supra note 166, at 7. 
 170 Id. at 3. 
 171 Wilmarth, supra note 51, (manuscript at 43). 
 172 See Dodd-Frank § 216. 
Do Not Delete 12/7/2011 2:18 PM 
2011] Dodd-Frank: Toward First Principles? 101 
Overall, after Dodd-Frank, financial institutions will still be 
able to use their size to privatize profits and socialize losses.  As 
David Skeel notes:  
Unlike in the New Deal, there is no serious effort to break the largest 
of these banks up or to meaningfully scale them down.  Because they 
are special, and because no one really believes the largest will be 
allowed to fail, they will have a competitive advantage over other 
financial institutions.173   
In the words of Lawrence Baxter, a current academic and 
former bank executive, “as long as these LCFIs [large, complex 
financial institutions] operate at their current scale and 
complexity, the financial system will remain fragile and 
vulnerable to massive sudden shocks.”174  Indeed, Baxter warns 
that “[i]f Congress, after the kind of crisis we have just been 
through, cannot itself impose scale limitations on very large 
financial institutions, I don’t think the regulators will ever be in 
a position to shut them down.”175  Put bluntly, Dodd-Frank does 
precious little to prevent or even mitigate TBTF. 
II.  POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FINANCIAL LEGISLATION 
Why these ambiguities, deferrals, and further studies?  In 
other words, why would sophisticated lawmakers choose largely 
to defer issues rather than confront them simply and directly?  
While there are benefits to delegating to agencies, the main 
factor underlying this voluminous legislation—which ironically 
postpones the major questions surrounding the financial crisis—
lies in the political economy of twenty-first century politics and 
the jostling among interest groups.176  By contrast, a path 
forward may lie in structural reform of the legislative process. 
To begin with, it is important to recognize the potentially 
important benefits of delegating to administrative agencies.  
Congress obviously has a full agenda and cannot do everything 
itself.  Agencies have access to information177 and the resources 
 
 173 SKEEL, supra note 33, at 9.  See also Baxter, supra note 88, at 213 (“One obvious 
way would have been to impose limitations on the size of financial institutions.  An 
amendment proposed by two senators did indeed place such an option squarely before the 
Senate.  Their amendment, however, met fierce opposition from the large banks and the 
Treasury Department and was eventually defeated.”);; Wilmarth, supra note 51, 
(manuscript at 101) (“As an alternative to Dodd-Frank’s regulatory reforms, Congress 
could have addressed the TBTF problem directly by mandating a breakup of large 
financial conglomerates.”). 
 174 Baxter, supra note 88, at 211. 
 175 Id. at 214. 
 176 See, e.g., Cheques and Imbalances, ECONOMIST, June 19, 2010, at 33, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/16380025?story_id=16380025&CFID=165030874&CFTO
KEN=60263434.   
 177 See, e.g., David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the 
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needed to enforce the law,178 while at the same time being less 
dependent on the vagaries of election cycles.179  Theoretically, 
delegations of power to agencies can help overcome the Condorcet 
paradox180 which leads to voting cycles.181  Indeed, even a cursory 
glance at economic history suggests an important role for 
administrative agencies—both domestically182 and 
internationally.183  Phrased starkly, “the maintenance of a 
 
Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 110 (2000) (noting that agencies have “access to the 
largest amount of accurate information”). 
 178 See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, The Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence, 1 MOD. L. 
REV. 5, 21 (1937) (“[L]egislation designed to protect an oppressed class will not be 
effectively enforced unless it sets up some independent agency capable of representing the 
interests of that class in securing enforcement of the legislation.”). 
 179 See, e.g., STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS 305 (2008) (“In 
contrast to legislators, administrators as [sic] far less dependent upon the types of 
political resources so valuable to members of Congress.  They are therefore less easily 
enlisted to advance the regulatory preferences of rent-seeking interests offering 
legislatively valuable resources.”);; David B. Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, 
Continued, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 438 (2002) (“The ability to influence legislators’ 
reelection prospects through campaign contributions, issue advertising, and the like, 
offers well-heeled interest groups much greater leverage over legislators than over agency 
bureaucrats . . . .”). 
 180 The core of the paradox is that “absent clear majority support for one of three or 
more options presented to a collective decisionmaking body there may be no rational 
means of aggregating individual preferences . . . .” Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided 
Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1222 (1994). 
 181 Jerry Mashaw explains:  
As voting theorists seldom tire of telling us, whenever three or more 
alternative policies exist there is the ever present possibility of a voting cycle 
which can be broken only by resort to some form of “dictatorship” result.  
Legislators must, therefore, often delegate decisive authority somewhere in 
order to decide.  There are any number of ways to deal with this problem—
rules committees, forced deadlines, random selection, allocations of vetoes, or 
the like.  Lumping alternatives together in a broad or vague statutory 
pronouncement and delegating choice to administrators is but another way of 
avoiding voting cycles through the establishment of dictators. 
Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 98 (1985) (citations omitted). 
 182 As Steven Croley observes:  
Americans have repeatedly turned to federal regulatory government in times of 
crisis to address the country’s most stubborn problems—from the banking 
crises and business corruption of the early twentieth century, through the 
Great Depression, stock market crisis, and labor unrest of the 1930s and 
1940s, through the environmental crisis and civil rights revolutions of the 
1960s and 1970s, to the threat of terrorism and the creation of the huge new 
Department of Homeland Security at the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
to name a few. 
CROLEY, supra note 179, at 3. 
 183 See, e.g., EZRA SULEIMAN, DISMANTLING DEMOCRATIC STATES 316 (2003) (“[T]he 
historical development of the U.S., Britain, France, Japan, Prussia, and, in recent times, 
Korea, Taiwan, and India indicates that the development of bureaucratic authority 
accompanied and facilitated the development of the state and the subsequent 
development of democracy.”). 
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democratic order . . . requires a trained, nonvenal bureaucratic 
machine.”184 
In the case of Dodd-Frank, however, the concern is that less 
than noble motivations may underlie the delegations and 
deferrals.  Researchers estimate that the financial services 
industry hired more than 3000 lobbyists to mold the 
legislation.185  One cannot help but wonder what role these 
lobbyists played in fostering an elaborate, yet perhaps less 
effective, statute.  One might argue that the political economy of 
financial reform simply involves a well-funded, relatively narrow 
interest group trumping the interests of widely dispersed groups 
of investors and consumers.  The idea is not new and can be 
traced back to James Madison’s account of how “factions” can 
organize to push their own agenda to the detriment of society at 
large.186  Mancur Olson’s research on public choice and group 
dynamics in the 1960s provides further elaboration: 
The smaller groups—the privileged and intermediate groups—can 
often defeat the large groups—the latent groups—which are normally 
supposed to prevail in democracy.  The privileged and intermediate 
groups often triumph over the numerically superior forces in the 
latent or large groups because the former are generally organized and 
active while the latter are normally unorganized and inactive.187 
Olson’s point is particularly acute as it relates to the 
financial sector, which funds generous political contributions and 
benefits from a revolving door between government officials and 
industry leaders.188 
 
 184 Id. at 7. 
 185 See, e.g., Cheques and Imbalances, supra note 176, at 33 (“The Centre for Public 
Integrity, a non-partisan research group, reckons the financial-services industries alone 
hired more than 3,000 lobbyists to influence the financial reform bill now before 
Congress.”).  See also Salter, supra note 155, at 28 (“Lobbying is at the epicenter of most 
rule-making activities involving business.”). 
 186 Madison defines factions as “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a 
majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse 
of passion . . . adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate 
interests of the community.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 57 (James Madison) (Jacob E. 
Cooke ed., 1961). 
 187 MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 128 (1965) (emphasis 
added).  See also id. at 142–43 (“The number and power of the lobbying organizations 
representing American business is indeed surprising in a democracy operating according 
to the majority rule. . . . The high degree of organization of business interests, and the 
power of these business interests, must be due in large part to the fact that the business 
community is divided into a series of (generally oligopolistic) ‘industries,’ each of which 
contains only a fairly small number of firms.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 188 See, e.g., Wilmarth, supra note 51, (manuscript at 60) (“[A]nalysts have pointed to 
strong evidence of ‘capture’ of financial regulatory agencies by LCFIs [large, complex 
financial institutions] during the two decades leading up to the financial crisis, due to 
factors such as (i) large political contributions made by LCFIs, (ii) an intellectual and 
policy environment favoring deregulation, and (iii) a continuous interchange of senior 
personnel between the largest financial institutions and the top echelons of the financial 
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As the product of such a political economy, Dodd-Frank’s 
lapses become rather unsurprising.  Perhaps the most concise 
depiction of the problem emerges from the work of Malcolm 
Salter who, fittingly enough, studies business strategy: 
The Rule-Making (influence) Game involves sending campaign 
contributions to politicians and then lobbying them to include 
loopholes in new laws—and then exploiting those loopholes, even 
when such behavior subverts the laws’ intent.  More subtly, the Rule-
Making Game also involves ensuring that new rules have either 
ambiguities or overly narrow regulations, offering rich opportunities 
for businesses to pursue innovative strategies to circumvent the rules 
in a murky legal environment.189 
As such, the “game” Salter outlines is doubly advantageous 
to the financial services industry: taking advantage of existing 
loopholes190 while simultaneously lobbying at the administrative 
agency level to ensure favorable future rulemaking.  As one 
commentator observes: “The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act 
has generated more work for lawyers and lobbyists since being 
signed into law than during even the frenzied days leading up to 
its passage in the House and Senate last summer.”191  
Importantly, deferring important questions to further study is 
also beneficial to industry interests.  Over time, as memories of 
the crisis fade there is an even greater opportunity for the 
financial services industry to influence the implementation of 
recommendations that may emerge from studies—a phenomenon 
John Coffee has dubbed the “regulatory sine curve.”192 
 
regulatory agencies.”). 
 189 Salter, supra note 155, at 14. 
 190 See also Kane, supra note 4, at 10 (“A complete diagnosis of modern financial 
crises must acknowledge that lobbyists for SIFs [systemically important private firms] 
have persuaded Congress to maintain a loophole-ridden regulatory structure.”).  Cf. di 
Lorenzo, supra note 120, at 66 (“Research into industry compliance with regulatory 
standards has demonstrated that greater certainty in statutory or regulatory mandates 
increases the likelihood of compliance.”). 
 191 Amanda Becker, Multitudes of Lobbyists Weigh in on Dodd-Frank Act, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/19/ 
AR2010111906465.html.  See also Salter, supra note 155, at 3 (“[Dodd-Frank] has 
unleashed massive lobbying by the finance industry to determine how the remaining rules 
will read and how much ‘gaming’ these rules will allow.”);; Kane, supra note 4, at 7 (“[T]he 
legislative framework Congress has asked regulators to implement gives a free pass to the 
dysfunctional ethical culture of lobbying that helped both to generate the crisis and to 
dictate the extravagant cost of the diverse ways that the financial sector was bailed out.”).  
 192 See Coffee, Bail-Ins, supra note 3, at 13 (“It posits the inevitability of a ‘regulatory 
sine curve’ under which regulatory activism, while intense in the wake of a regulatory 
crisis, relaxes thereafter, as lobbying and the impact of regulatory arbitrage soften the 
resistance of regulators.”).  See also Beale, supra note 72, (manuscript at 25) (“Moreover, 
even if there is an attitudinal shift that avoids regulatory capture, re-regulation can be 
expected to wane in importance over time, as economic conditions improve and memories 
of the Great Recession recede.”). 
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The overarching problem with all of this is “that gaming 
crosses the line of acceptability and becomes institutionally 
corrupt when such institution-sanctioned behavior subverts the 
intent of society’s rules, thereby harming the public interest, or 
weakens the capacity of the institution to achieve its espoused 
goals by undermining its legitimate procedures and core 
values.”193  One could be forgiven for believing that an industry’s 
success should rest on its business acumen, not its ability to 
manipulate government.194  Yet regrettably, this simple point 
remains understudied.  As Amitai Eztioni suggests: “The 
economic literature is replete with references to distortions the 
government causes in the market.  Comparable attention should 
be paid to manipulations of the government by participants in 
the market, and the effects of these manipulations on the 
internal structures of markets.”195  In terms of reform, perhaps 
the single most urgent change would be to reform campaign 
finance “in a way that will stop the drift toward a plutocracy of 
one dollar, one vote?”196  As if the struggle were not difficult 
enough, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence makes it even more 
difficult to separate politics from corporate power.197 
CONCLUSION 
At one level, the story of Dodd-Frank is simple.  Given its 
vast delegation to regulators,198 the legislation’s success will rest 
on how successfully the agencies will be able to implement its 
 
 193 Salter, supra note 155, at 3–4. 
 194 See AMITAI ETZIONI, NEXT 65 (2001) (“But aside from its being unfair to cut the 
vulnerable members of the society off the dole while allowing huge corporations to feed 
from the public trough, one must note that corporate welfare is incompatible with a sound 
economic environment.  It rewards those actors who are best at manipulating the 
government in their favor (often by providing campaign contributions to members of state 
and federal legislatures) rather than those who have proven themselves in the 
marketplace by better R&D, production, or marketing.”). 
 195 AMITAI ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION 217 (1988).  See also Warren J. Samuels, 
Interrelations Between Legal and Economic Processes, 14 J.L. & ECON. 435, 442 (1971) 
(“[T]he critical question is who uses the government for what ends.”). 
 196 ETZIONI, supra note 194, at xi.  As Steven Croley points out, if “the relationship 
between legislators and regulation-seeking interest groups constitutes the real lynchpin 
of the public choice theory—then reforms in the area of campaigu [sic] finance, for one 
example, might go far to alleviate the problems that lead public choice theorists to call for 
deregulation.” Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative 
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 50–51 (1998). 
 197 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. __ (2010) (slip op. No. 08-
205) (Jan. 21, 2010).  For an analysis of this opinion, see Reza Dibadj, Citizens United as 
Corporate Law Narrative, __ NEXUS: CHAPMAN’S J.L. & PUB. POL’Y __ (forthcoming 2011). 
 198 See Karmel, supra note 43, at 52 (“Much of the implementation of Dodd-Frank has 
been left to the various functional regulators of financial institutions and some of the 
more controversial proposed provisions have been relegated to studies.”). 
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provisions and carry out and act upon the results of its 
innumerable and controversial studies.199 
Yet, beyond the statute’s artful nuances and deferrals, there 
lies potential for mischief.  Dodd-Frank does not provide us with 
a new regulatory framework,200 nor does it “sufficiently address 
the problem of agency discretion generally, or the problem of an 
agency’s discretion to forebear, in particular.”201  As David Skeel 
has pointed out, such a fuzzy regulatory conception “invites the 
government to channel political policy through the big financial 
institutions by giving regulators sweeping discretion in the 
enforcement of nearly every aspect of the legislation.”202  Indeed, 
as Skeel asks: 
The special treatment of the largest firms and the reliance on ad hoc 
intervention raises a perplexing puzzle.  Given that this is precisely 
what so many Americans found offensive about the bailouts of 2008 
and were so anxious to reform, how did we end up with legislation 
that has such similar qualities?203 
In other words, how did we end up with legislation that in 
many ways still favors institutions that both precipitated the 
crisis and are out of public favor?  Perhaps the answer lies in the 
reality that “individual citizens and voters have been steadily 
edged out of the public sphere”204 with a concomitant rise in the 
influence of the financial sector.205  One might argue that this 
state of affairs cannot persist in the long-run;206 put simply, 
institutions need public trust to survive. 
 
 199 See, e.g., Pooran, supra note 53, at 24 (“[T]he true effectiveness of Wall Street 
Reform lies in the faithfulness of its implementation by national regulatory agencies in 
the US.”);; Salter, supra note 155, at 24 (“The success of financial reform depends largely 
on whether regulators write definitions and rules that support the intent of the act, and 
then, of course, enforce them.”);; Kane, supra note 4, at 3 (“The Act puts responsibility for 
avoiding future crises squarely on the competence and good intentions of future 
regulators.”). 
 200 See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 43, at 6–7 (“The regulatory reform legislation of 2010 
also does not put any new regulatory system in place, but rather attempts to modify and 
reform the existing system, giving expanded authority to the same regulators that failed 
to prevent the crisis of 2008.”). 
 201 Schooner, supra note 27, at 994. 
 202 SKEEL, supra note 33, at 11.  See also id. at 8 (“The two themes that emerge, 
repeatedly and unmistakably, from the 2,000 pages of legislation are (1) government 
partnership with the largest financial institutions and (2) ad hoc intervention by 
regulators rather than a more predictable, rules-based response to crises.”). 
 203 Id. at 12. 
 204 Salter, supra note 155, at 24. 
 205 Cf. id. at 14 (“If ever a case could be made against such free-wheeling deregulation 
and confidence by policymakers in industry self-regulation, the 2008–09 financial crisis is 
it.  Yet the veto power of the financial sector over public policy remains remarkably strong 
even as the sector has lost popular support.”). 
 206 See Kane, supra note 4, at 16 (“It is unreasonable for an industry to expect to skin 
taxpayers forever.”). 
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Regardless of this precarious state of affairs, however, it is 
likely to remain unless more citizens enter the conversation.  To 
be sure, thoughtful commentators have expressed justifiable 
concern that citizens have become generally disengaged from 
public discourse.207  But the relative weight the polity has spent 
discussing economic issues is particularly troubling.  Note, for 
instance, how much time we have spent considering social 
issues—abortion, guns, gay marriage, to name just a few.  By 
contrast, observe how stunningly little time we have spent 
discussing economic issues that affect our everyday livelihood.  
Granted, economic topics are often not as glamorous as social 
ones; after all, one might argue, we all have better things to do 
with our time than worry about something as esoteric as 
financial reform legislation.  Perhaps, but the stakes are simply 
too high.  Our society faces a stark choice: we can continue to let 
the so-called financial experts make decisions for us as we stand 
by and await the next crisis.  Or we can begin a dialogue by 
asking some simple questions that might return us to common 
sense and first principles.208 
 
 
 207 See, e.g., SULEIMAN, supra note 183, at 314 (“The citizen has been encouraged to 
view himself as a client purchasing the government’s services.  What incentives does such 
a perception provide for participation in associational life?”). 
 208 Cf. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 3 (2005) (“[L]iberty means not only freedom 
from government coercion but also the freedom to participate in the government itself.”). 
